China's Shipbuilding Monopoly Is a Strategic Threat
China's shipyards now build more than half of the world's commercial vessels, up from less than 5 percent in 2000, while American shipyards account for roughly 0.1 percent of global commercial ship production. That imbalance is not a market accident. It is the product of two decades of Chinese state subsidies, protected domestic orders, and a deliberate strategy to dominate the maritime industrial base. A nation that cannot build the ships that carry its commerce cannot secure its supply lines in a crisis.
The United States Trade Representative documented this pattern in an investigation launched during the Biden administration and concluded in 2024. The report found that China's targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors distorted global competition and undermined supply chain resilience. Beijing did not hide its aim. The 14th Five-Year Plan identifies shipbuilding as a strategic industry, and state-backed yards have absorbed losses to capture market share. The result is a fleet of Chinese-built hulls that now carries a large share of global trade, including cargo bound for American ports.
This is an economic problem and a defense problem. The U.S. Navy depends on a shrinking pool of domestic shipyards for maintenance and new construction. The Jones Act fleet, which carries cargo between American ports, is aging and depends on foreign-built hulls. If a conflict in the Pacific disrupted Asian shipbuilding, the United States would struggle to replace merchant vessels and sustain a long war. Dependence on a single competitor for something as basic as hulls is a vulnerability no superpower should accept.
The Fees Were Already Working
In April 2025, the Trump administration announced Section 301 port fees on Chinese-owned, operated, and built vessels calling at United States ports. The first-phase fee on Chinese vessel owners and operators started at $50 per net ton per voyage, rising by $30 per ton each year. Fees on Chinese-built ships began at $18 per net ton or $120 per container. The administration scheduled the first phase to take effect after 180 days, which landed in October 2025.
The mere prospect of the fees moved the market. Industry data showed that new orders at Chinese shipyards fell 23.5 percent during the first nine months of 2025 after the announcement. China's share of global new shipbuilding orders dropped from roughly 72 percent in late 2024 to about 52 percent in the first half of 2025, according to BIMCO, an international shipping association. For the first time in years, shipowners began looking seriously at yards in South Korea, Japan, and even the United States.
Then, in November 2025, the administration suspended the fees for one year following a Trump-Xi summit and a broader trade agreement. The suspension is scheduled to last until November 9, 2026. Beijing reportedly agreed to pause retaliatory measures against U.S.-linked shipping. That is not nothing. But it is not worth surrendering the leverage that was beginning to restructure a strategically vital industry.
A Real Maritime Industrial Base Needs More Than Fees
Restarting the fees is the right first step, but it cannot be the last step if the goal is a genuine revival of American shipbuilding rather than a temporary squeeze on Chinese imports. Port fees raise the cost of using Chinese hulls, yet they do not by themselves restore American yards. The United States needs tax incentives, workforce training, long-term Navy and Coast Guard procurement, and regulatory relief that make domestic yards competitive. Senators Mark Kelly and Elizabeth Warren made that point in a June 8, 2026, letter urging U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer to reinstate the suspended fees immediately.
Their bipartisan SHIPS for America Act, introduced with Senator Todd Young, would expand the U.S.-flag fleet and invest in maritime workforce development. That kind of legislation matters because tariffs without capacity are a tax without a future. American yards can compete on quality and innovation, but they cannot match subsidized Chinese prices overnight. A serious industrial policy must bridge the gap with predictable orders and patient capital.
Washington should also tighten the rules on Jones Act waivers. During recent Middle East disruptions, the administration granted waivers allowing foreign-flag vessels to carry cargo between U.S. ports. Those waivers may have eased short-term logistics, but they undermined the very maritime base the port fees are supposed to rebuild. A coherent strategy cannot simultaneously punish Chinese shipbuilding and hand business to foreign operators. The message to American mariners and shipbuilders has to be consistent: we are building here, and we are sailing under our own flag.
The Trump administration's port fees were not an act of protectionism for its own sake. They were a response to a national security threat dressed up as commerce. Letting that tool sit unused for a full year gives China time to retake market share and lock in orders that stretch into the 2030s. The fees should resume well before November 9. American security depends on it.
